



































  The Volatility Costs of Procyclical Lending Standards:













   
 
Bertrand Gruss and Silvia Sgherri
  
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
The Volatility Costs of Procyclical Lending Standards: 




EUI Working Paper ECO 2009/07 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Economics Department of the EUI if the paper is to be 







© 2009 Bertrand Gruss and Silvia Sgherri 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.euThe Volatility Costs of Procyclical Lending Standards:







The ongoing ﬁnancial turmoil has triggered a lively debate on ways of containing
systemic risk and lessening the likelihood of future boom-and-bust episodes in credit
markets. Particularly, it has been argued that banking regulation might attenuate pro-
cyclicality in lending standards by affecting the behavior of banks capital buffers. This
paper uses a two-country DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions to illustrate how pro-
cyclicality in borrowing limits reinforces the ”overreaction” of asset prices to shocks
described by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), and to quantify the stabilization gains from
policies aimed at smoothing cyclical swings in credit conditions. Results suggest that,
in ﬁnancially constrained economies, the ensuing volatility reduction in equity prices,
investment, and external imbalances would be sizable. In the presence of cross-border
spillovers, gains would be even higher.
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The ongoing ﬁnancial turmoil—stemming from creditworthiness problems in U.S. subprime mort-
gage market—has made evident that asset price dynamics are likely to amplify business cycle
ﬂuctuations by making bank lending procyclical. Indeed, the rapid growth of asset prices during
booms raises the value of collateral, thus stimulating credit growth. Speculation on price swings
represents an additional source of demand for credit, while resulting wealth effects accentuate the
spending boom. This process is further reinforced by the greater liquidity that characterizes ﬁxed
assets during periods of ﬁnancial euphoria. However, this behavior will tend to increase the vul-
nerability of the ﬁnancial system during the subsequent downswing, when it becomes clear that the
loans did not have adequate backing. Asset price deﬂation will then be reinforced as debtors strive
to cover their ﬁnancial obligations and creditors will seek to liquidate their collateral in conditions
of reduced asset liquidity.
The traditional focus of risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements on microeconomic (rather
than macroeconomic) risk assessment—with individual ﬁnancial intermediaries failing to internal-
ize the collective risks assumed during the upswing—can further increase such a procyclical bias
in bank lending. In fact, it is during crises that the excess of risk assumed during economic booms
becomes evident and ultimately makes it necessary to write off loan portfolios. In a system where
loan-loss provisions are tied to loan delinquency, the sharp increase in such delinquency during
crises reduces ﬁnancial institutions’ capital and, hence, their lending capacity. This, in conjunction
with the greater perceived level of risk, triggers the credit squeeze that characterizes such periods,
further reinforcing the downswing in economic activity and asset prices, and thus the quality of the
portfolios of ﬁnancial intermediaries.1
While there seems to be a consensus on the fact that ﬁnancial systems are inherently subject to
cycles, it is not yet clear how policymakers and regulators should intervene to mitigate these cycli-
cal effects. Some supervisors (for example, in Spain) have advocated (and implemented) the use
of countercyclical provisioning methodologies (sometimes referred to as “dynamic” or “statisti-
cal”), which require banks to provision more (than evidenced by losses) in good times, when the
identiﬁed need for provisioning is smaller, and draw against these reserves in bad times, when the
need for provisions is larger. Given the interaction between provisions and capital, it is argued
that such forward-looking provisioning methods could reduce the procyclicality of regulatory re-
quirements.2 Others, however, have argued that it is rather the lack of complete implementation
of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation that produces such undesired effects.3 The adoption of
mark-to-market accounting guidelines—such as the IAS 39—has also been blamed as a predomi-
1Borio and others (2001) review the factors contributing to swings in credit conditions which may amplify macroe-
conomic cycles. They stress the role played by the inappropriate response of ﬁnancial market participants to shifts
in the level of risk—especially in its systematic component—as an important source of this ampliﬁcation. Incorrect
responses appear to be due not only to a misassessment of risk over time, but also to distortive incentives, likely to
make ﬁnancial market participants react in a socially suboptimal way.
2There is a growing literature on the potential procyclicality of the new risk-sensitive bank capital regulation—
known as Basel II—mirroring the concern that the increase in capital requirements during downturns might severely
contract the supply of credit. On this point see, among others, Saurina and Trucharte (2007) and Repullo and Suarez
(2008). For a recent policy discussion, see Goodhart and Persaud (2008).
3On this point, see Caruana and Narain (2008).
1nant source of procyclicality in lending standards, through its effects on loan-loss provisions.4
As the ongoing credit squeeze keeps fueling fears about its impact on real activity, the debate
on how best to amend current bank regulation is expected to continue for quite a while. In the
meantime, a question arises: how large would be the gains, in terms of macroeconomic volatil-
ity, from introducing policy measures aimed at mitigating procyclical swings in credit conditions?
Thispaperattemptstoprovideaquantitativeanswertothisquestioninthecontextofatwo-country,
two-good, incomplete markets model where Home agents are assumed to be more impatient than
Foreign agents and international debt contracts are imperfectly enforceable. Reﬂecting inefﬁciency
inthedebtenforcementprocedure, themodelallowsforaﬁnancialfriction ` alaKiyotakiandMoore
(1997), according to which borrowing is limited to a given fraction of the value of a collateral, the
”loan-to-value ratio” (LTV hereafter). The model explores the channels through which the behav-
ior of lending standards interacts with the business cycle, highlighting the role of asset prices. It
shows that, in a credit-constrained economy, a procyclical behavior of credit standards would re-
inforce the ”overreaction” of asset prices to shocks presented in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999).
In our model, ﬁnancial friction and asset-pricing behavior is similar to Mendoza (2006) and
Mendoza and Smith (2006), although with important differences. First, our setting corresponds
to a two-country, two-good model. Second, in our framework, foreign debt is traded only by
Households, whereas Mendoza (2006) assume that both Households and ﬁrms face a borrowing
constraint, the latter affecting working capital loans. Third and most importantly, both Mendoza
(2006) and Mendoza and Smith (2006) consider ”occasionally binding” collateral constraints, as
they focus on the ability of these constraints to trigger ”sudden stop phenomena” at times when
they are binding. On the contrary, in this paper we are interested in normal credit cycles in ﬁnan-
cially constrained economies; we hence focus on the dynamics around a steady state where the
collateral constraints are always binding.5 Finally, all the abovementioned studies using collat-
eral constraints regard the LTV ratio as a time-invariant structural parameter.6 However, empirical
evidence suggests that lending standards vary over time and tend to co-move with the business
cycle. To mirror such procyclicality in credit standards, we assume that leverage is stochastic and
we calibrate this process in such a way that its cyclical pattern matches the one found in actual data.
To calibrate the model, we use standard values in the literature and, where pertinent, post-1999
data from Estonia and Sweden. As explained below, some features of these two economies resem-
ble closely those of a representative-agent two-country model—that is, the theoretical framework
adopted in this paper.7 The model is subsequently used to assess quantitatively the impact on
macroeconomic volatility from adopting policies aimed at smoothing the procyclicality of lending
4See, for example, Jim´ enez and Saurina (2006) and Taylor and Goodhart (2006).
5Several models deal with always-binding constraints; some examples include Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and
Minetti (2006), Callegari (2007), and Calza and others (2007).
6Guajardo (2008) develops a small open economy model with a credit-market imperfection in the form of a
liquidity- (rather than collateral-) constraint where the fraction of expenditures that households are required to self-
ﬁnance does vary over time. In the model—calibrated using Chilean data—the evolution of the liquidity requirement
is found to be highly persistent and more volatile than output.
7It is worth stressing, nonetheless, that the role of procyclical lending standards in amplifying business cycles
ﬂuctuationscouldhaveequallybeenstudiedusingalternativesetupslike, forinstance, aﬁnancially-constrained(closed
or small open) economy with heterogeneous agents, as in Iacoviello (2005) or Iacoviello and Minetti (2002).
2standards. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the impact of an exogenous drop in the correlation of the LTV
ratio with the cycle. We interpret such an exogenous change in the cyclical pattern of the leverage
ratio as a policy measure, i.e. the introduction of a countercyclical element in banking prudential
regulation. We do not intend here to explore how such a policy could be implemented nor which
would be the optimal way to do it. Rather, we try to provide a ﬁrst gauge of the eventual gains in
terms of macroeconomic volatility thanks to the implementation of such a policy. We believe that
quantifying these gains constitutes a valuable input for deciding whether or not to engage in the
greater effort of exploring feasible regulatory alternatives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the empirical evidence on the procycli-
cality of ﬁrms’ leverage and its relationship with economic growth and macroeconomic volatility.
Section III develops the theoretical model whose calibration is provided in section IV. This model
is used for policy experiments, the results of which are discussed in section V. Section VI performs
sensitivity analysis of the outcomes to different model speciﬁcations, while section VII draws con-
clusions.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Several studies have been looking into the behavior of banks’ capital buffers and lending standards,
in order to explain their relationship with the aggregate ﬂuctuations. There seems to be conclusive
evidence that credit conditions not only vary over the cycle but also behave procyclically. This
may happen for a number of different reasons, as stressed, for instance, by Borio and others (2001)
and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006).8
Ayuso and others (2004), for example, estimate the relationship between the Spanish business
cycle and capital buffers held by Spanish banks, using data from 1986 to 2000. They argue that
the procyclicality of capital buffers is due to factors which are beyond the inherent features of
risk-sensitive bank capital regulation, such as Basel II. 9 How about banks’ lending standards?
By looking at the contract terms of loans granted by 483 US banks from 1977 to 1993, Asea and
Blomberg (1998), for instance, suggest that there is a systematic tendency for lending standards
to vary over the business cycle: during the upswing of the cycle the risk premia banks charge on
loans decreases, loan size increases and the probability of requiring higher collateral decreases; the
opposite occurs during the downswing of the cycle. Changes in lending standards are also found to
have the greatest impact during expansions, when banks tend to lend to riskier borrowers.10 More
recently, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) have examined the dynamics of both macro aggregates
8In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients’ creditworthiness, Dell’Ariccia and Mar-
quez (2006) show that banks may loosen lending standards when information asymmetries vis-` a-vis other banks are
low. In equilibrium, this reduction in standards leads to a deterioration of banks’ portfolios, a reduction in their proﬁts,
and an aggregate credit expansion, while increasing the risk of ﬁnancial instability.
9Ayuso and others (2004) focus their attention on voluntary capital buffers, as most of the banks in their sample
appear to hold capital well beyond the level required by regulators. After controlling for other determinants of the
surplus capital—which could themselves behave procyclically—they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between
business cycle and capital buffers.
10Asea and Blomberg (1998) explore the relationship between changes in bank lending standards and the economic
cycle using a Markov-switching panel data model. As opposed to other empirical works, the focus is not exclusively
on extreme periods of ﬁnancial distress but on lending standard cycles due to normal bank activity.
3and ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial indicators during ”credit boom” episodes. Using cross-country data for
48 industrial and emerging countries from 1960 to 2006, they ﬁnd that credit booms are associ-
ated with periods of economic expansion, rising equity and housing prices, and widening external
deﬁcits. Evidence of procyclicality also shows up from ﬁrm level data: the credit boom—and the
macroeconomic upswing that accompany them—coincide with higher leverage, ﬁrm value and use
of external ﬁnancing by ﬁrms. Bank data too appear consistent with procyclical lending standards:
ratios of capital adequacy and non-performing loans seem to decrease during credit booms.
In this section, we contribute to this literature by focussing on the behavior of ﬁrms’ leverage in
16 advanced and 12 emerging European economies over the period from January 1999 until April
2008, using the ratio between private credit to the corporate sector and the value of equities.11 A
ﬁrst glance at the data seems to conﬁrm that ﬁrms’ leverage is not constant over time: indeed,
in selected European countries, it varies substantially over the sample period (Figure 1 and Table
1). To examine more closely the dynamic relationship between corporate ﬁnancial conditions and
real activity and to unveil divergences in the strength and in the timing of macroﬁnancial linkages
across Europe, ﬁnancial conditions indices (henceforth, FCIs) have been constructed by means
of country-speciﬁc vector autoregression models and corresponding impulse response functions.
Speciﬁcally, impulse responses from relevant ﬁnancial variables are combined with estimates of
the shocks to each of these variables to calculate the total impulse to growth in a given month.
For each economy, the estimated FCI contains statistically signiﬁcant effects on GDP growth from
shocks to domestic (real) credit growth, (real) equity price changes, and real interest rates.12 Na-
tional FCIs are meant to account for the timing of transmission from ﬁnancial markets to real
activity and to incorporate the endogenous response of ﬁnancial variables to the business cycle, as
well as to each other. Allowing for these dynamic interrelations is important when attempting to
disentangle the impact of multiple variables that are highly correlated.13
Do increases in ﬁrms’ leverage contribute to a nation’s economic growth? In which economies
is this contribution more relevant? Overall changes in ﬁnancial conditions are estimated to account
for a large portion of the variation in real GDP growth over the business cycle of almost all Eu-
ropean countries in the sample, although with substantial cross-country heterogeneity (Figure 2).
Among the advanced economies, innovations to ﬁrms’ borrowing are found to have contributed
substantially to ﬂuctuations in annual growth in Austria (40 percent), Sweden (25 percent), and, to
a lesser extent, the United Kingdom and Greece (10 percent). Among emerging economies, ﬁnan-
cial conditions play—overall—a much greater role. They account for over 70 percent of growth
11Ideally, an aggregate measure of ﬁrms’ leverage should relate the amount of ﬁrms’ reliance on bank lending to the
value of equities for the same sample of ﬁrms. This is not the case in our empirical measure of country-level ﬁrms’
leverage, which is constructed using data from national central banks for credit to the corporate sector and data from
the Bloomberg dataset for the value of market capitalization. However, a comparison of our leverage indicator and
one derived from Moody’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc dataset—spanning a shorter time period and covering a smaller number of
European economies—features similar levels and time proﬁles.
12Monthly data for credit growth in the corporate sector have been provided by national central banks; equity prices
are taken from Bloomberg, while 3-month interbank interest rates and consumer price indices have been collected
from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Quarterly data on GDP growth have been exponentially interpolated
to derive corresponding series with monthly frequency.
13The construction of FCIs follows closely the methodology developed in Swiston (2008) and is detailed for conve-
nience in the appendix.
4variation in Hungary, Russia, Latvia, and Estonia, underscoring, once again, the vulnerability of
these economies corporate sector to downswings in ﬁnancing conditions. Given the relatively
lower level of development of these ﬁnancial markets, it is not surprising that these contributions
are mostly due to changes in bank lending conditions.
Possibly more importantly, our empirical analysis shows that—on average—an increase in ﬁrms’
leverage provides a greater contribution to growth in periods of economic expansion. In other
words, according to our estimates, the impact on growth of innovations to ﬁrms’ leverage tends
to be procyclical, although with important differences on a country-by-country basis (Figure 3).
Building on this evidence, other interesting empirical regularities can be identiﬁed. First, changes
in ﬁrms’ borrowing tend to be more sensitive to changes in asset prices in those economies where
ﬁrms leverage co-moves more closely with the business cycle (Figure 4). Second, a higher de-
gree of procyclicality in ﬁrms’ leverage seems to be associated with higher volatility in private
investment (Figure 5). Remarkably, oversensitivity of credit availability to asset price changes,
greater procyclicality in ﬁrms’ leverage, and higher investment volatility appear to be character-
izing mostly those economies—like the Baltic countries—where bank lending conditions are also
found to play the greatest role in explaining growth ﬂuctuations.
III. THE MODEL
In order (i) to better understand these empirical regularities and (ii) to assess quantitatively the
impact of reducing the degree of procyclicality in lending conditions, we develop a stylized two-
country (Home and Foreign), two-good model with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. The only ﬁ-
nancial asset in the model is a non-contingent bond. A ﬁnancial friction ` a la Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) is also assumed, so that borrowing is limited to a given fraction of the value of the collateral.
The asset used as collateral in this economy is equity. The model is calibrated such that the Home
economy is a net borrower and the Foreign economy a net lender. Home agents are assumed to be
more impatient than Foreign agents.14
A. HOME ECONOMY
Households and preferences






















, when σ = 1,
14On this issue, see also Ghironi, Iscan and Rebucci (2005).
5where ht denotes the fraction of the time endowment devoted to work. ct is Households’ consump-

















where cH and cF denote the domestic and foreign goods respectively. Optimality conditions imply



































t )1−η  1
1−η , (5)
where (5) is the utility-based aggregate price index in the Home economy. We set the composite
good in (2) as the num´ eraire good and we normalize its price to one: Pt = 1.
Households supply labor and invest in domestic equity (capital). They receive labor payments
and dividends from their equity holdings, make consumption decisions, and lend or borrow in
a one-period non-contingent zero-coupon internationally-traded bond. The Households’ budget
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where dt+1 is the amount of debt issued at t paying back dt+1 units of the Home consumption
composite at period t +1, Rt is the -gross- real interest rate, and pH
t is the relative price of the





t since Pt = 1). As
the real wage (wt), the dividend rate on equity holdings (rt), and the market price of equity (qt)
are valued in terms of the domestically-produced good (yt), they all appear multiplied by pH
t in the
budget constraint, in order to express them in terms of the consumption index. The last term on
the left-hand side is the adjustment cost on debt holding, with ¯ d denoting the steady-state level of
debt.15.
Financial frictions. The world credit market is assumed to be imperfect: Households need to
guarantee their debt by offering domestic assets as collateral. Since the seminal contribution of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), endogenous credit constraints have been widely used to analyze a
number of different issues in business cycle models. For example, in a close economy setting,
Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) build a variant of Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing model and use a col-
lateral constraint to explain the overreaction of asset prices to shocks to fundamentals. Iacoviello
15Given that markets are incomplete, the law of motion for bonds is nonstationary. We hence introduced a quadratic
cost on debt adjustment to make it stationary, without affecting the ﬁnal solution (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003))
6(2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2008) analyze the transmission and ampliﬁcation of monetary pol-
icy, asset prices and technology shocks. Calza and others (2007) study the role of institutional
aspects of credit markets in affecting the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Mendoza and
Smith (2006) and Mendoza (2006) extend the role of the collateral constraint in Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999) to a small open economy setup to analyze its ability to trigger sudden stops in
emerging economies. Also in a small open economy setup, Iacoviello and Minetti (2002) study
how the transmission of monetary policy shocks to house prices is affected by the degree of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization. In a two-country model with collateralized borrowing in domestic and interna-
tional capital markets, Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) examine the impact of ﬁnancial constraints in
the international transmission of business cycles. Callegari (2007) also uses a two-country model,
even though in this case the collateral constraint applies to domestic debt in each country and the
focus is on the international transmission of ﬁscal shocks.
In our model the collateral constraint takes the form of the margin requirement proposed by Aiya-
gari and Gertler (1999) and used in Mendoza (2006)16. Similar to the latter, Households use




can be borrowed is a fraction ϕt of the market value of the capital stock owned by Households.18
While a speciﬁcation like (7) makes the constraint resemble a debt contract with a margin clause,
there are several other ﬁnancial arrangements that operate in a similar fashion, without explicitly
allowing for margin clauses. These include the use of value-at-risk models by investment banks
to set collateral or capital requirements, or simply the capital requirements imposed to ﬁnancial
institutions by regulatory agencies (Mendoza (2006)).
The leverage ratio is typically introduced in the literature as an invariant structural parameter of the
model. In our model, instead, the LTV ratio is allowed to vary over time. In particular, we assume
that ϕt is a stochastic variable and that its evolution reﬂects changes in lending standards.
Optimality conditions. Given initial values of debt and capital d0 and k0, the Households’ prob-
lem is to choose sequences {cH
t ,cF
t ,ht,kt+1,dt+1}, taking wt,rt,qt,pH
t ,pF
t ,ϕt and Rt as given, in
order to maximize (1), subject to equations (6) and (7). Letting λt and λtχt be the multipliers on
those constraints and Ui,t the marginal utility of variable i at time t, the efﬁciency conditions for
the Households’ problem in the Home economy are:
16We do not derive here the constraint from an optimal contract but we impose it directly, as in the models with
endogenous borrowing constraints by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Iacoviello (2005) and
Mendoza (2006). This constraint could result, for example, from an environment of limited enforcement.
17Most of the studies using endogenous credit constraints employ housing or real estate as collateral, while in this
model we use equity. This is in line with the works by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Mendoza and Smith (2006), and
Mendoza (2006). Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) also use capital as collateral in one version of their model but, as its
price is ﬁxed, the transmission mechanism is still driven by real estate as collateral.
18An ex-post collateral constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), would instead imply that debt cannot exceed
the expected discounted one-period-ahead liquidation value of the collateral.

























If the borrowing constraint were not binding, χt would be zero and equation (10) would be a
standard Euler equation for debt. However, we assume that agents in the Home economy are more
impatient than agents in the Foreign economy and therefore (7) is always binding. Indeed, given
the assumptions on the discount factors β and β∗, in a deterministic steady state χ is strictly greater
than zero and, hence, (7) holds with equality. The extent to which this is also the case in a stochas-
tic equilibrium (i.e. outside the steady state) mainly depends on the size of the gap between the
Home and Foreign discount factors and the variance of the shocks hitting the economy. In this
paper, as in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2008) among others, we keep the variability
of shocks ”small enough” relative to the degree of impatience and solve the model by linearizing
around the steady state with a binding collateral constraint. Note that this implies, from equation
(10), that Households in the Home economy always face an endogenous external ﬁnancing pre-
mium on the effective (i.e. shadow) real interest rate at which they borrow: Rt
1−χtRt >Rt. The higher
effective interest rate reﬂects the fact that, at the prevailing market interest rate Rt, agents in the
Home economy would like to borrow more than they are actually allowed to.
By denoting the Households’ stochastic discount factor in equation (11) as   βt and solving that












where the actual valuation of equity by Households corresponds to the expected discounted ﬂow
of future dividend payments.19
Firms and technology
Every period ﬁrms produce yt of an international tradable good through a constant returns to scale




where At is the stochastic country speciﬁc level of total factor productivity (TFP hereafter). Firms
make plans for labor demand and investment and, since they are owned by Households, they dis-
count future proﬁts taking as given   βt. The representative ﬁrm’s problem is to choose labor demand
19Note, however, that here   βt includes both the multiplier χt and the LTV ratio ϕt, none of which would appear in a
frictionless model.

















   
, (14)
with   β−1 = 1 and subject to the law of motion for capital (net investment):
xt = kt+1−kt. (15)
The presence of function Φ(.) implies that investment expenditure needs to cover for a capital ad-
justment cost. This cost is usually included to avoid counterfactual volatility of investment. The












, as in Mendoza (2006).





































Equation (17), the ﬁrst order condition with respect to xt, determines the ﬁrm’s demand for invest-
ment or, equivalently, its equity supply function. Equation (18) is the ﬁrm’s optimality condition













In equilibrium, the equity market clears: equity price adjusts such that Households’ and Firms’
investment plans are consistent with each other. Indeed, from equations (12) and (19), this implies
that qt = Qt and rt = Rk
t for asset prices to be consistent with Households’ demand and Firms’
supply of equity.
The role of equity
To understand the role of equity and its price in shaping equilibrium dynamics, it is useful to
derive an expression for the equity premium in the Home economy and explore how it is affected
by the fact that such an economy is ﬁnancially constrained. The return on equity in units of the











. Using the Euler equations for
bonds and equity (10) and (11) we can retrieve the equity premium, e.g. the excess return on equity









































making it clear that if the collateral constraint is binding (χt > 0), then there is a positive wedge
between the economy equity premium and the ”fundamental” one—that is, the one that would pre-
vail in a frictionless environment.21 Indeed, if the collateral constraint is not binding (χt = 0), then









, which is the standard excess return corresponding
to a frictionless asset-pricing model (the ”fundamental” risk premium). Given the deﬁnition on
return on equity, equation (20) also shows how the equity premium (and the mentioned wedge)

































where the sequence {Et(R
q
t+1+j)}∞
j=0 is given by (20). It should thus be clear that an increase of
the equity premium at period t (or at any other time in the future) would increase the rate at which
future dividends are discounted, thereby lowering the price of equity at period t.
The behavior of the equity premium (as well as the one of the wedge between the actual and
the ”fundamental” risk premium) plays an important role in the dynamics of the model. In turn, as
Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza (2006) point out, the behavior of the equity premium is
affected both directly and indirectly by the presence of ﬁnancial market frictions. Indeed, a bind-
ing collateral constraint in the current period affects directly the wedge between the ”fundamental”
and the actual equity premium, as indicated by the second term of equation (21). For a given value
of the LTV ratio, a tighter borrowing constraint (χ) in period t—originated for example by a drop
in productivity that lowers equity prices—would reinforce such a drop, by pushing up the equity
premium (e.g. by pushing down the current price of equity).
20To simplify the algebra, in what follows we neglect the terms related to the portfolio adjustment cost (i.e. ω = 0).
In any case, those terms are negligible.
21Note that the gross real interest rate is always larger than the LTV ratio.
10Indirectly, the probability that the constraint will be binding in the future is captured by the covari-
ance expression in the ﬁrst term of equation (21). Intuitively, the possibility of a tighter borrowing
constraint in period t +1 is likely to reduce (i.e., make more negative) the covariance with the
stochastic discount factor. In other words, the more stringent the borrowing constraint, the bigger
the drop in consumption at t +1 (i.e., the rise in Uc,t+1) associated with a given fall in the ex-post
return on equity. The presence of these effects—which are due to ﬁnancial frictions—may hence
amplify the volatility of the equity premium and, thereby, the volatility of equity prices.
Time-varying lending standards. Let us ﬁrst consider the variability of credit conditions around
the average LTV ratio (ϕ). If, for example, an adverse productivity shock pushes the economic
into a downturn, domestic production declines and the shadow value of relaxing the borrowing
constraint on international debt (χ) increases above its long term average. This implies a rise in the
equity premium (and hence a decline in the equity price), as shown by the second term of equation
(21). What if lending conditions behave procyclically? In this case, during the downturn, lending
standards would be tightened, meaning that less debt will be issued for the same value of collat-
eralized assets. The drop in ϕt would increase even more the equity premium wedge, implying
an even higher risk premium and an even lower equity price. Therefore, a procyclical behavior of
lending standards in this model would accentuate the overreaction and volatility of asset prices,
as signaled by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). More importantly—and as shown below by numeri-
cal simulations—the increased overreaction of asset prices implied by the procyclical behavior of
lending carries important costs in terms of the volatility of key macroeconomic variables.
Let us then consider the behavior of the equity premium under different average LTV ratios. A
higher average value of ϕ in equation (21) would narrow the gap between the actual and the ”fun-
damental” risk premium for given values of the collateral multiplier (χ). This implies that the
overreaction—and thus the volatility—of equity prices caused by the ﬁnancial friction would be
lower in an economy that enjoys a higher leverage on average.
B. FOREIGN ECONOMY
To close the model, one needs to specify the behavior of the Foreign economy. Here too, House-
holds face a borrowing constraint as in equation (7). It is assumed, nevertheless, that agents in
the Home economy are more impatient than in the Foreign economy: β < β∗. This implies that
the Foreign economy is a net creditor, so that the borrowing constraint becomes irrelevant for this
economy. Accordingly, one can abstract from capital accumulation in the Foreign economy, with-
out any loss of generality: output is here modeled as an endowment process, with Households
deriving utility only from consumption.
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The budget constraint for the Households in the Foreign economy can hence be expressed in terms

























where ζt is the real exchange rate and y∗
t is a random endowment process. Given the budget
























































Under the abovementioned simplifying assumptions, the net foreign asset position of the Home
economy at period t is simply equal to −dt, while the real exchange rate is given by ζt = P∗
t .22







Two sources of shocks are considered in this paper: technological and ﬁnancial shocks.
22Since the law of one price holds and we abstract from nominal issues—assuming that the nominal exchange rate
is identically equal to one—then PH∗
t = PH
t . In the absence of a home bias (γ = γ∗ = 0.5), this would imply that
purchasing power parity holds and that the price of the consumption index is the same in both economies. Under this
peculiar condition, the real exchange rate would also be constant and equal to one. In the presence of a home bias, the
real exchange rate is given by the price of the Foreign consumption index (ζt = P∗
t ), as the Home consumption index
is set as the num´ eraire (and its price is equal to 1).
12Productivity shocks. The two stochastic processes that govern productivity are At in the Home
economy and y∗
























where the vector of shocks εt =( ε1,t,ε2,t)  follows a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean
and contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix V. The technology shocks in both economies
are thus stochastically related by the spillover parameters B12 and B21 and by the off-diagonal
elements of the covariance matrixV.
Credit shocks. As the main purpose of the model is to assess quantitatively the impact of chang-
ing the cyclical pattern of lending standards on the volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates,
we allow the LTV ratio—a proxy for the lending conditions in the economy—to vary over time. In
this way, a reduction in the LTV (ϕt) is interpreted as a downswing in the credit cycle—that is, a
tightening in lending standards.





t ∼ iid N(0,σ2
ϕ) , (31)
where ¯ ϕ is the steady-state LTV. A higher ¯ ϕ corresponds to an economy that is less ﬁnancially
constrained, on average.
Regarding the link of lending standards with the business cycle, we consider different cyclical
patterns, by assuming a non-zero correlation between shocks to the LTV ratio and shocks to do-
mestic productivity.
D. EQUILIBRIUM AND SOLUTION METHOD
We assume that the Home economy is populated by a continuum of agents of unit mass while the
Foreign economy is populated by a continuum of mass N. If N = 1, the model is a symmetric two-
country model, while for N → ∞ and γ∗ → 1 the Home economy becomes a small open economy.














The market clearing condition for the world credit market is:
dt +Nd∗
t = 0 (34)
13Given the assumptions on the discount factors and the ﬁnancial friction, in the absence of shocks











t ,χt,Rt} satisfying equations (2), (4) to (11)—with equation (7) holding with
equality—(13), (15) to (18), (22) to (25) and (32) to (34), given equations (31) to (30), k0, d0 and
together with the relevant transversality conditions.
Numerical solution technique. As explained above, the collateral constraint is assumed to be
always binding in this model. This implies that the ampliﬁcation created by the ﬁnancial fric-
tion is symmetric and is always present, like—for example—in Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and
Neri (2008), and Calza and others (2007). Accordingly—and as it is indeed the case in all the
abovementioned studies—the model is solved by log-linearizing the equations characterizing the
equilibrium around the deterministic steady-state and by solving the resulting system of linear
difference equations to obtain the policy functions.23
IV. CALIBRATION
To calibrate the model, we use standard values in the literature and— where pertinent—post-1999
data from Estonia and Sweden proxying for the Home and Foreign economy, respectively. This
choice is due to the fact that some features of these two economies seem to constitute good empir-
ical counterparts for a representative-agent two-country model—that is, the theoretical framework
adopted in this paper. First, Estonia is—on aggregate—a net borrower and relies heavily on for-
eign bank credit (see Figure 6); on the contrary, Sweden is—on aggregate—a net creditor. Second,
Estonia faces a highly concentrated pool of foreign lenders, with Sweden accounting for more
than 90 percent of outstanding claims (see Figure 7). Modeling each economy by means of a two-
country, representative-agent model seems, therefore, to be a reasonable stylization of reality. It is,
nonetheless, important to stress that we simply use data from these two economies for calibration
purposes: we have no intention to use the model to replicate Estonian corporate borrowing and
asset price dynamics over recent years.
Preferences, technology and productivity shocks. A summary of the parameter values used for
calibration is shown in Table 2. Speciﬁcally, the discount factor in the ”patient” economy, β∗,i s
set to 0.99, while β = 0.96, in line with the values used in the literature. These values imply an
equity premium in the deterministic steady state of 7.6 percent when the LTV =40 percent and 3.9
percent when the LTV = 70 percent, which are reasonable values. The coefﬁcient of risk aversion
σ is set to 1 in the benchmark calibration (i.e. logarithmic utility in consumption). Neverthe-
less, alternative values are used for sensitivity analysis. The inverse of the (Frisch) wage elasticity
of labor supply (ψ) is set to 3, which gives an elasticity of 1/3, well in the range suggested by
23Note that if the focus were on the effect of occasionally-binding constraints, as it is the case in Mendoza (2006),
thissolutiontechniquewouldprobablyleadtoapoorapproximation, asitwouldfailtocapturethenon-lineardynamics
produced when the economy switches from a state in which the constraint does not bind to a state in which it binds.
14evidence from micro-data (0.05 to 0.5). However, as the business cycle literature typically uses
values of elasticity of unity and even higher, alternative parameterizations are assumed for sensi-
tivity analysis (see section VI). 24 We set ν in order to match an average time spent working of 33
percent of total time in steady state. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods η is set equal to 1.5 in the benchmark calibration (as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992);
common values in the literature range from 0.5t o2 .5). The shares of domestic goods in the con-
sumption index for each economy—denoted as γ and γ∗, respectively—are set to 57.5 percent.25
The portfolio-adjusting cost parameter (ω) is set equal to 0.00074, as in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2003).26 In the benchmark model N = 1, meaning the two economies are of equal size.
The capital share in yt, α, has been set to 0.30. Capital depreciation rate δ is set to 2.5 percent
per quarter, a standard value in the literature. The capital adjustment cost parameter φ is set to 10
in order to obtain a plausible level of investment volatility under the benchmark calibration.
The Home TFP autoregressive parameter B11 is set to 0.94 and the Foreign endowment autoregres-
sive coefﬁcient B22 to 0.97. The spillover parameters B12 and B21 are set to zero in the benchmark
calibration, while in section VI positive spillovers are considered, in line with Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992) and Heathcote and Perri (2002). The standard deviation of TFP shocks (σε1)i s
set to 2.2 percent, which gives a volatility of Home GDP close to 2.8 percent, roughly in line with
evidence from Estonia. σε2 is set to 1.14 percent, broadly in line with Swedish data. Finally, the
correlation between Home and Foreign technology shocks (ρ(ε1,ε2)) is set to 0.04, implying a quite
low degree of technology interdependence between the two economies.
The loan-to-value ratio. In all cited studies using endogenous collateral constraints the LTV ra-
tio is introduced as a time-invariant structural parameter. In particular, among the papers using
housing as collateral, LTV ratios are in the order of 80-90 percent, although in some cases values
of 50 percent are also considered.27 In a model using equity as collateral—although within an
”occasionally-binding constraint” setting—Mendoza (2006) assumes LTV ratios of 13.9 percent
for ﬁrms’ debt and 24.8 percent for households’ debt. In our benchmark calibration, the LTV ratio
is assumed to be a stochastic variable, whose unconditional mean (¯ ϕ) is set to 40 percent, which is
somehow within the two extremes.
The benchmark parameterization for the stochastic process driving the LTV ratio implies ρϕ = 0.9
and σϕ = 1.85 percent. In Table 1, we show the results of ﬁtting an AR(1) model to demeaned
LTV ratios from a sub-sample of emerging European economies. Remarkably, the calibrated au-
toregressive parameter (ρϕ) is within the range of estimates, whereas the shocks’ standard error
(σϕ) is clearly on the conservative side.
We also consider alternative non-zero degrees of correlation between the shock to the LTV and
24See discussion in Gal´ ı, Gertler and L´ opez-Salido (2007).
25We consider alternative values in section VI.
26This parameter is set to 0.01 in Callegari (2007) and estimated to be 0.00042 in Uribe and Yue (2006).
27Calza and others (2007) consider LTV ratios ranging from 50 to 90 percent to analyze the effect of different
institutional characteristics of mortgage markets, 50 percent being the LTV ratio estimated for the Italian mortgage
market.
15the shock to the Home TFP (ρLTV,A), in order to proxy for different cyclical patterns in lending
standards, some of them associated with active prudential regulation policies. In the benchmark
calibration, we set this correlation equal to 0.5, in line with the empirical evidence for the Baltics,
as shown in Figure 3.
V. POLICY EXPERIMENT: ALTERING THE CYCLICAL PATTERN OF LENDING
STANDARDS
The model presented in the previous sections is used to assess the impact of introducing a (generic
and unspeciﬁed) policy measure aimed at reducing procyclicality in lending standards. In partic-
ular, we try to assess its impact on the cyclical properties of the key macroeconomic variables of
the model economy.
In our benchmark speciﬁcation, lending standards behave procyclically: during an economic up-
turn, borrowing constraints are relaxed more that proportionally. This means that credit grows by
more than the (cyclical) increase in the market value of collateralized assets, leading to a credit
”boom”.28 Viceversa, during an economic downturn, credit contracts are tightened by more than
the reduction in the value of the collateralized assets, causing a credit ”squeeze”. This regularity is
consistent with ﬁndings on bank capital buffers’ behavior in Europe.29
We thus simulate 500 replications of our model economy under the benchmark parameterization,
each of them 150 periods long, while dropping the ﬁrst 50 periods to avoid starting value bias. The
time unit in the model is set to be one quarter. We ﬁlter the resulting time series using the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter and compute the corresponding average moments across simulations. The impulse
responses to a negative (one standard deviation) shock to productivity and lending standards—
plotted, respectively, in Figures 8 and 9—provide important intuitions behind the behavior of the
model economy under the benchmark calibration, allowing for alternative leverage levels. We then
repeat the simulation process for two different levels of leverage (i.e., two different average LTV
ratios), assuming zero ex-ante correlation of lending conditions with the cycle. Figure 10 summa-
rizes the policy simulation’s results for different combinations of LTV ratios (ranging from 0.3 to
0.7) and different degrees of correlation between lending standards and productivity (considering
correlations within the range of 0.6 to -.03). In this ﬁgure we highlight the impact of our hypothet-
ical policy on the volatilities of equity prices, gross investment over GDP, consumption over GDP,
and the current-account-to-GDP ratio.30
A. BENCHMARK LEVERAGE LEVEL
Table 3 presents the main statistics corresponding to the Benchmark calibration, where credit con-
ditions are procyclical (the correlation between innovations to the LTV ratio and productivity,
ρLTV,A, is assumed to be 0.5). Note, ﬁrst, that using this parameterization we obtain a volatility
28Here, we refer to collateral value in a broad sense: it can be the value of an explicit collateral asset, put up by
Firms or Households at the moment of contracting debt, or an implicit collateral—that is, the lenders’ assessment of
the present value of the project to be ﬁnanced.
29See, for instance, Jokipii and Milne (2006) and Ayuso and others (2004).
30Consumption is deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator to construct this ratio; that is,
c/pH
y is considered.
16of consumption σc/pH (deﬂated with the GDP deﬂator pH) slightly bigger than the one of GDP (a
relative volatility of consumption above one is found to be a characteristic of emerging economies
business cycles). Foreign debt is very volatile and highly correlated with the price of equity in the
Home economy (ρd,q = 0.77), and hence highly procyclical. Accordingly, the current account is
found to be negatively correlated with the price of equity (ρca/y,q = −0.32) and highly volatile.
We then replicate the simulations assuming the introduction of the abovementioned policy mea-
sure. While the LTV ratio is still assumed to ﬂuctuate around the same long-run average, the
innovations to the LTV ratio are now regarded as fully independent of those to domestic TFP
(ρLTV,A = 0). The results are reported in Table 4.
Moving from a procyclical to an acyclical pattern of credit conditions reduces signiﬁcantly the
volatility of equity prices and, consequently, the volatility of investment: σq and σx are 3.5 percent
and 3.6 percent lower than in the benchmark scenario.31 Because of the role of equity as a col-
lateral, the volatility of debt and current account are also strongly reduced: the reduction in these
volatilities is as high as 14 percent. Gains from this policy are also substantial in terms of con-
sumption volatility (σc/pH decreases by 1.7 percent), especially in terms of its share of domestic
GDP (σ(c/pH)/y decreases 13.5 percent). The volatility of GDP gets also reduced, though mildly.
The correlation of equity prices with foreign debt and with the real interest rate decreases after the
introduction of the policy measure, resulting in a lower correlation of equity prices with the current
account deﬁcit (ρca/y,q decreases by about one third).
The mechanism driving this reduction in volatility is linked to the behavior of the wedge between
the actual and the ”fundamental” equity premium illustrated in section III. This wedge exists be-
cause the economy is ﬁnancially constrained and its behavior is endogenous to the model. A
procyclical behavior of the LTV ratio would further magnify such a mechanism, implying a higher
volatility of both the equity premium and the equity price. In this sense, introducing a policy
measure that reduces the procyclicality of the credit conditions allows to reduce the volatility of
macroeconomic aggregates—mainly by smoothing the ”overreaction” of equity prices to shocks
to fundamentals.
B. ALTERNATIVE LEVERAGE LEVELS
In this section we analyze how the behavior of the artiﬁcial economy changes when we consider
a less ﬁnancially constrained setting, i.e. a higher average LTV ratio. Again, we simulate both a
benchmark scenario—with procyclical credit conditions—and an active policy scenario.
Before considering the effects of introducing the policy measure, it is worth analyzing the behav-
ior of a higher leveraged economy under the original assumption of procyclical lending standards.
As it can be seen from Table 5, a more leveraged economy would be characterized by a lower
volatility of equity prices, investment, real interest rate and foreign debt, but by a higher volatility
of consumption, both in levels and as a fraction of GDP. The intuition behind this is the following.
31The results we report for investment (x) correspond to gross investment (kt+1 −(1−δ)kt), as it is usual in the
literature. Note also that the reduction of volatility of each variable is expressed as a percentage difference with
respect to the volatility under the benchmark cyclicality of lending standards.
17On the one hand, a higher leverage implies that a given shock to the value of the collateral now
implies a higher wealth effect in the budget constraint of domestic Households, thereby inducing a
higher change in spending—both on consumption and on equity accumulation. On the other hand,
a higher leverage implies that the size of the wedge between the actual and the ”fundamental” price
of equity—and hence the size of the distortion—is lower on average. This implies a lower ”over-
reaction” of equity prices to shocks to fundamentals in the ”higher-leverage” setting and, hence, a
lower incentive to adjust equity accumulation. Indeed, following a positive shock to fundamentals,
the trade-off between consuming and investing a given extra amount of borrowing is more tilted
toward consumption in a ”higher-leverage setting” than in a ”lower-leverage setting”. The magni-
tude of this second effect is predominant, resulting in a lower volatility of investment and a higher
volatility of consumption. This is captured by the impulse responses functions of equity prices,
consumption, investment and debt to a shock that moves the ”fundamental” price of equity (e.g.
a shock to productivity) under different values of the LTV ratio (see Figure 8). Note also that, in
a higher-leverage economy, the real interest rate is more correlated to the evolution of GDP and
less correlated to the evolution of equity prices. Moreover, the trade balance becomes positively
correlated with equity prices, while the current account deﬁcit becomes essentially independent
from the evolution of equity prices.
Although the volatilities of the key macroeconomic variables are different in this higher-leverage
context, the main qualitative effects from introducing this policy measure are essentially the same
as in the lower-leverage scenario (see Table 5). In particular, lower volatility of equity prices, in-
vestment, foreign debt and consumption are achieved, the reductions being 4 percent, 4.4 percent,
11.5 percent, and 1.5 percent, respectively. Also, the correlations of equity prices with debt and
with the real interest rate get reduced, with the latter becoming even negative. Finally, in a higher-
leverage economy, equity prices and the current account deﬁcit start co-moving in the opposite
direction: a rise of equity prices is now associated with an improvement in the external deﬁcit.
Comparing the relative volatility gains from the introduction of the policy measure under the two
leverage scenarios seems to suggest that, when the economy is more ﬁnancially constrained, there
is slightly more to gain in terms of consumption and external imbalances stabilization (debt, trade
balance and current account deﬁcit); the opposite holds true for the stabilization of equity prices
and investment.32
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We perform sensitivity analysis of the policy simulation results along several dimensions.33 In
particular, we test alternative values for the (Frisch) wage elasticity of labor supply (1/ψ), the
degree of productivity spillover across countries (B12 and B21), the degree of home bias(γ and γ∗),
and the coefﬁcient of risk aversion (σ). Overall, the simulation results seem extremely robust, with
the most relevant differences associated with the change in preferences.
32Note however that the volatility gains are estimated around two different steady states when considering the two
leverage scenarios.
33The results are shown in Table 6.
18Wage elasticity of labor supply. As illustrated in section IV, the value of ψ assumed for the
benchmark calibration is well in line with evidence from micro-data, but the values used in busi-
ness cycle models are typically much smaller. Thus, we perform again our simulations using a
lower parameter value: ψ = 0.3 instead of ψ = 3. As can be seen from Table 6, the volatility
gains associated with the adoption of a policy aimed at smoothing the procyclicality of lending
standards are broadly unchanged, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The reduction in volatility
of investment is slightly higher, while the opposite holds for consumption (although, in terms of
ratios to GDP, the volatilities are essentially unchanged). Probably the most remarkable change
is associated with the bigger fall in GDP volatility implied by the policy under this alternative
parameterization.
Spillovers. Forthebenchmarkcalibrationweassumedzerospilloversbetweentechnologyshocks
to Home and Foreign economies, as well as a low value for the correlation of the innovations.
However it seems reasonable that two economies that are strongly ﬁnancially integrated also face
important technology spillovers. In this section, we thus assume B12 = B21 = 0.08, which is very
similar to the value used in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and within the range 0-0.1 used in
Heathcote and Perri (2002).34 In order to keep unchanged the overall persistence of the stochastic
processes, we simultaneously adjust B11 and B22 (in the same proportion), such that the largest
eigenvalue is the same than in the benchmark case. The results in Table 6 show that implementing
the policy in the presence of spillovers between the two economies would lead to even higher gains
in terms of stabilizing investment (-4.3 percent instead of -3.6 percent), consumption (-3.3 percent
vs. -1.7 percent) and GDP (-0.7 percent instead of -0.4 percent), than it would have been the case
in the absence of spillovers.
Consumption home bias. A higher degree of home bias in consumption (in both economies)
would imply that the policy has roughly the same gains in terms of investment volatility, but con-
sumption volatility gains from the policy experiment would be lower. Naturally, the volatility of
the real exchange rate would be higher with higher home bias (approximately four times as higher
as in the benchmark calibration). Accordingly, the volatility gains from reducing it—thanks to the
introduction of the policy measure—would be higher.
Preferences. The functional form for preferences and the risk aversion parameter (i.e. implying
logarithmic utility in consumption) adopted in this paper are standard for models using always-
binding collateral constraints (see for example Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2008), Calza
and others (2007) and Callegari (2007)). Nevertheless, we solve and simulate the model under the
alternative assumption that σ = 2. In this case, there is a higher gain in terms of GDP stabilization,
while the gains in terms of investment volatility are unchanged. The main difference originates
form the behavior of consumption. With σ = 2, consumption is much less volatile than with log
utility, under any degree of ciclicality of leverage. Moreover, there is no reduction in consump-
tion volatility from implementing this policy measure: if anything, consumption deﬂated by pH
is even more volatile. The gains in terms of consumption-to-GDP volatility are nevertheless un-
changed with respect to the benchmark calibration, and hence robust to changes in the risk aversion
parameter.
34These studies consider two-blocks given by US and Europe.
19VII. CONCLUSIONS
While the ﬁnal impact of the ongoing ﬁnancial turmoil—and the consequent turnaround in the
credit cycle—still remains to be assessed, the discussion on the need to introduce modiﬁcations in
regulation of the ﬁnancial industry has already emerged strongly in policy and academic circles.
In particular, there seems to be a consensus on the pervasive effects of procyclical credit standards
on amplifying business cycles. This paper provides further evidence suggesting that: (i) changes
in ﬁrms’ borrowing tend to be more sensitive to changes in asset prices in those economies where
ﬁrms leverage co-moves more closely with the business cycle; (ii) a higher degree of procyclical-
ity in ﬁrms’ leverage tends to be associated with higher volatility in private investment; and (iii)
oversensitivity of credit availability to asset price changes, greater procyclicality in ﬁrms’ leverage,
and higher investment volatility is likely to characterize mostly those economies—like the Baltic
countries—where growth ﬂuctuations are more vulnerable to changes in bank lending conditions.
To provide a ﬁrst gauge of the potential effectiveness of policies aiming at smoothing the cyclical
pattern of lending standards, a stylized two-country model economy is developed. It illustrates
how the double role of equities—as collateral in the (international) lending process and as value
of the capital used for production—may affect the volatility of investment, corporate debt, and the
current account. The model captures the idea that observed cross-country differences in investment
and current account dynamics may be consistent with the fact that lending conditions and discount
factors are not symmetric across countries. This is achieved by assuming that in one of the two
economies agents are credit constrained and “impatient”: that is, they do not smooth consumption
based on permanent income, but have preferences tilted toward current consumption. Their access
to credit on international ﬁnancial markets is constrained by the value of their collateral, which is
endogenously tied to the evolution of equity prices. A less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁnancial mar-
ket is represented by a higher borrowing limit—a stochastic process that determines the extent to
which capital can be used as collateral for corporate borrowing. This structural model is consis-
tent with the empirical ﬁndings that investment and current account dynamics are more responsive
to changes in ﬁnancial conditions in economies with tighter borrowing constraints. In economies
with lower borrowing limits—as equity prices have fallen following either a technology shock or
an exogenous tightening to the lending standard—impatient agents see their borrowing curtailed by
more against the declining value of their collateral, and are thus able to borrow less against collat-
eral for any given value of their capital, compared with those in economies with higher borrowing
limits. Although the model is highly stylized—abstracting from many factors, such as monetary
policy and nominal issues in general—the exercise is nevertheless instructive: it provides some
insight into how macroeconomic volatility varies according to the characteristics of ﬁnancial mar-
kets in economies where ﬁrms’ borrowing limits are tied to collateral values and where agents do
not behave in the farsighted way that is more traditionally supposed.
To calibrate the model, we use post-1999 data for one of the Baltic economies, relying heav-
ily on international credit from advanced—and arguably not ﬁnancially constrained—European
economies, such as Sweden. In the context of a ﬁnancially-constrained economy, simulating the
effects of a policy measure aimed at smoothing the cyclical pattern of lending standards leads to
sizeable reductions in the volatility of equity prices, investment, consumption, and an even higher
reductioninthevolatilityofexternalimbalances: currentaccountdeﬁcit, tradebalance, andnetfor-
20eign position. In the presence of cross-country technology spillovers, the simulations suggest that
stabilization gains might be even higher. The results are robust to different assumptions regarding
wage elasticity of labor supply, home-bias in consumption and—to a given extent—modiﬁcations
in preferences.
APPENDIX
This section estimates VAR-based ﬁnancial condition indices (FCIs) for 16 advanced European
economies and 12 emerging European economies. We estimate country-speciﬁc VAR models us-
ing monthly data over the sample period 1999:1-2008:4. Each VAR model includes four endoge-
nous variables: (i) (real) GDP growth, (ii) the (real) 3-month interbank rate (CPI); (iii) changes
in equity prices (deﬂated using the CPI); and (iv) changes in (real) private credit to the corporate
sector. With the exception of the interest rate, all variables are in logs. A constant is also added
as exogenous variables. Based on the Schwartz information criterion, a lag order of three is found
optimal for this model across all countries.
Country-speciﬁc FCIs are calculated with a dynamic weight structure computed using impulse
response functions (IRFs) from each VAR, allowing the FCI to accurately incorporate the timing
of transmission from ﬁnancial markets to real activity. The main advantage of this methodology is
its ability to account for endogenous interrelations between the variables in the system. This frame-
work is particularly appropriate for dealing with ﬁnancial variables, as—a priori—theoretical links
between them maybe existing due—for instance—to the implicit effects of the interest rate term
structure or the discounted cash ﬂow approach to asset valuation. The main challenge in using a
VAR framework relates to the identiﬁcation of contemporaneous shocks—e.g., the decomposition
of the residuals into the portion due to exogenous disturbances to each variable, and the portion due
to the effects on each variable of contemporaneous shocks to the other variables in the system. In
this paper, the identiﬁcation of ﬁnancial shocks is achieved through a standard recursive procedure
based on a Cholesky factorization of the estimated variance-covariance matrix. The variables in the
model are hence ordered according to their relative sluggishness, e.g., the degree to which they re-
spond to developments occurring in other variables within the quarter.35 GDP growth is assumed
to be relatively more sluggish than the other variables in the system, so that shocks to ﬁnancial
variables in the current period do not affect GDP growth because of the primacy of GDP growth
in the Cholesky ordering. The policy-related variable—the 3-month interbank interest rate—is or-
dered after all other variables, preceded—ﬁrst—by changes in equity prices and—then—by credit
growth.
Within this framework, the estimated response of GDP growth to each of the ﬁnancial variables can
be combined with the measure of shocks to each variable to calculate the total impulse to growth
35To exemplify, the Cholesky decomposition (Sims, 1980) of the shocks of a 3-variable VAR assigns all of the cor-
relation between the errors in the ﬁrst, second, and third equation to the ﬁrst variable, while any remaining correlation
between the errors in the second and third equation is assigned to the second, and so on for VARs with more variables.
This implies that both the magnitude of the shocks and the estimated responses of the variables to each other depend,
to some extent, on the assigned ordering.













where the r’s denote IRFs of GDP growth with respect to each other variable in the VAR, j’s index
the variables, and the i’s index the time period. The ﬁrst term inside the brackets represents the
response of GDP growth in quartert to a ﬁnancial shock occurring in the previous quarter. Because
the variables in the system are expressed in ﬁrst differences, the marginal current impact of a shock
that occurred before the previous quarter–the term inside the second summation–is measured di-
rectly by the shocks effect on GDP growth in the previous period.
The FCI thus measures the total contribution to GDP growth in a given quarter from shocks to
ﬁnancial variables over the previous m quarters. In this way, the issue of dynamic weights in a
VAR-based FCI becomes straightforward thanks to the use of IRFs, for which the weight on a
particular variable i periods into the future is merely the response of economic activity at time t+i
to a shock hitting that variable at time t.
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t ∼ iid N(0,σ2
ϕ)
Country Observations   ρ Std.err.   σϕ
Croatia 46 0.92 0.052 0.055
Estonia 49 0.89 0.0458 0.076
Lithuania 34 0.91 0.083 0.046
Russia 37 0.65 0.157 0.062
Slovenia 52 0.84 0.0922 0.046
Turkey 53 0.8 0.11 0.084
Table 1: Results from Estimating an AR(1) Processes to Demeaned LTVs.
Parameter Description Value
Preferences
β Home discount factor 0.96
β∗ Foreign discount factor 0.99
σ Coefﬁcient of risk aversion 1
ψ Inverse of (Frisch) wage elasticity of labor supply 3
ν Disutility of labor parameter Set to match h=33% in SS
γ,γ∗ Bias in consumption towards domestically produced goods 0.575
η Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 1.5
Technology and Productivity
α Capital share in Production 0.3
δ Capital depreciation rate (quarterly) 0.025
φ Capital adjustment cost parameter 10
B11 Home TFP autoregressive parameter 0.94
σε1 Standard deviation of Home TFP shocks 0.022
B22 Foreign endowment autoregressive parameter 0.97
σε2 Standard deviation of Foreign endowment shocks 0.0114
B12 Spillover parameter, Foreign to Home 0
B21 Spillover parameter, Home to Foreign B12
ρε1,ε2 Cross-correlation A-y* shocks 0.07
Credit standards
¯ ϕ Average LTV ratio 0.4
ρϕ LTV autoregressive parameter 0.9
σϕ Standard deviation of lending standards shocks 0.0185
ρLTV,A Cross-correlation LTV-A shocks 0.5
Other
ω Portfolio adjustment cost parameter 0.00074
N Relative size of Foreign relative to Home economy 1
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration.
25Figure 1: Time Variation in Loan-To-Value Ratios
26Figure 2: Share of Output Variation Explained by Credit and Asset Price Shocks
Figure 3: Degree of Cyclicality in Credit Innovations
27Figure 4: Procyclicality in Credit Innovations and Sensitivity of Credit to Asset Price Shocks
Figure 5: Procyclicality in Credit Innovations and Macroeconomic Volatility
28Figure 6: Increasing Reliance of Emerging Europe on Foreign Funding
Figure 7: Concentration of Emerging Europe Exposure to Western Europe
29Volatilities
σy 0.0285 σq 0.017
σx 0.0674 σR 0.022
σx/y 0.0396 σζ 0.0026
σc 0.0256 σnx/y 0.0144
σc/pH 0.0286 σca/y 0.0642
σ(c/pH)/y 0.0163 σd 0.033
Cross-correlations with Home GDP
ρx,y 0.9843 ρq,y 0.9694
ρx/y,y 0.9538 ρR,y 0.1772
ρc,y 0.6995 ρd,y 0.7244
ρc/pH,y 0.8369 ρnx/y,y -0.0939
ρ(c/pH)/y,y -0.2834 ρca/y,y -0.1575
ρh,y 0.2834 ρy,y−1 0.7212
Cross-correlations with equity prices
ρx,q 0.9963 ρR,q 0.3361
ρc,q 0.7823 ρnx/y,q -0.2455
ρd,q 0.7721 ρca/y,q -0.3161
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments from Simulated Series under Benchmark Calibration
30Policy exercise - LTV=0.4
Volatilities ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
σy 0.0285 0.0284 -0.4%
σx 0.0674 0.065 -3.6%
σx/y 0.0396 0.0372 -6.1%
σc 0.0256 0.0245 -4.3%
σc/pH 0.0286 0.0281 -1.7%
σ(c/pH)/y 0.0163 0.0141 -13.5%
σq 0.017 0.0164 -3.5%
σR 0.022 0.0189 -14.1%
σnx/y 0.0144 0.0125 -13.2%
σca/y 0.0642 0.0552 -14.0%
σd 0.033 0.0284 -13.9%
Cross-correlations with Home GDP ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
ρx,y 0.9843 0.9865 0.2%
ρc,y 0.6995 0.7574 8.3%
ρq,y 0.9694 0.973 0.4%
ρR,y 0.1772 0.0664 -62.5%
ρnx/y,y -0.0939 -0.1395 48.6%
ρca/y,y -0.1575 -0.0765 -51.4%
ρd,y 0.7244 0.4205 -42.0%
Cross-correlations with equity prices ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
ρd,q 0.7721 0.4822 -37.5%
ρR,q 0.3361 0.2039 -39.3%
ρnx/y,q -0.2455 -0.2605 6.1%
ρca/y,q -0.3161 -0.2124 -32.8%
Table 4: Policy Exercise Results (Average LTV = 0.4)
31Policy exercise - LTV=0.7
Volatilities ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
σy 0.0281 0.028 -0.4%
σx 0.0596 0.057 -4.4%
σx/y 0.034 0.0315 -7.4%
σc 0.0307 0.0297 -3.3%
σc/pH 0.0335 0.033 -1.5%
σ(c/pH)/y 0.0239 0.0213 -10.9%
σq 0.015 0.0144 -4.0%
σR 0.016 0.0143 -10.6%
σnx/y 0.0156 0.014 -10.3%
σca/y 0.0922 0.0816 -11.5%
σd 0.0295 0.0261 -11.5%
Cross-correlations with Home GDP ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
ρx,y 0.9501 0.9523 0.2%
ρc,y 0.5789 0.6492 12.1%
ρq,y 0.9444 0.9439 -0.1%
ρR,y 0.2163 0.0381 -82.4%
ρnx/y,y -0.088 -0.163 85.2%
ρca/y,y -0.1933 -0.0489 -74.7%
ρd,y 0.697 0.3398 -51.2%
Cross-correlations with equity prices ρLTV,A = 0.5 ρLTV,A = 0 % difference
ρd,q 0.7151 0.4055 -43.3%
ρR,q -0.0069 -0.1638 2273.9%
ρnx/y,q 0.1792 0.1102 -38.5%
ρca/y,q 0.0391 0.1674 328.1%
Table 5: Policy Exercise Results (Average LTV = 0.7)
































































































Figure 8: IRFs to a Negative Productivity Shock under Alternative Leverage Levels
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35Sensitivity Analysis - LTV=0.4
Scenario : Benchmark ψ = 0.3 B12 = B21 = 0.08 γ = γ∗ = 0.75 σ = 2
ρLTV,A : Bench % diff. Bench % diff. Bench % diff. Bench % diff. Bench % diff.
σy 0.0285 -0.4% 0.0307 -1.6% 0.0272 -0.7% 0.0286 -1.0% 0.0264 -1.9%
σx 0.0674 -3.6% 0.0711 -4.1% 0.0634 -4.3% 0.0649 -3.5% 0.0715 -3.8%
σx/y 0.0396 -6.1% 0.0411 -6.1% 0.0368 -6.8% 0.0367 -5.7% 0.0458 -4.8%
σc 0.0256 -4.3% 0.024 -3.3% 0.0248 -5.2% 0.0269 -2.2% 0.0184 0.0%
σc/pH 0.0286 -1.7% 0.0276 -0.7% 0.0273 -3.3% 0.0274 -0.4% 0.0216 1.9%
σ(c/pH)/y 0.0163 -13.5% 0.0161 -13.7% 0.0159 -11.3% 0.0134 -14.9% 0.0107 -14.0%
σq 0.017 -3.5% 0.0179 -3.9% 0.016 -4.4% 0.0164 -3.7% 0.018 -3.3%
σR 0.022 -14.1% 0.0198 -13.6% 0.0219 -13.7% 0.023 -15.7% 0.0247 -14.6%
σnx/y 0.0144 -13.2% 0.0131 -13.7% 0.0139 -12.2% 0.0103 -13.6% 0.0084 -11.9%
σca/y 0.0642 -14.0% 0.0581 -14.1% 0.0633 -13.4% 0.0611 -15.9% 0.0642 -14.8%
σd 0.033 -13.9% 0.0327 -13.5% 0.0323 -12.7% 0.0336 -14.9% 0.034 -14.1%
σζ 0.0026 0.0% 0.0028 -3.6% 0.0024 0.0% 0.0096 -8.3% 0.0024 0.0%
ρx,y 0.9843 0.2% 0.9876 0.2% 0.9864 0.1% 0.9926 0.0% 0.9828 0.2%
ρc,y 0.6995 8.3% 0.7064 8.2% 0.7042 4.6% 0.7988 6.4% 0.8018 5.4%
ρq,y 0.9694 0.4% 0.9724 0.3% 0.9745 0.2% 0.9811 -0.1% 0.9685 0.3%
ρR,y 0.1772 -62.5% 0.0404 -238.6% 0.2457 -56.3% 0.2302 -43.0% 0.1823 -50.7%
ρnx/y,y -0.0939 48.6% 0.0424 -148.8% -0.0801 -3.4% -0.128 65.6% -0.0717 161.5%
ρca/y,y -0.1575 -51.4% -0.019 -348.9% -0.2095 -54.7% -0.2133 -34.0% -0.1688 -41.2%
ρd,y 0.7244 -42.0% 0.7183 -39.8% 0.7222 -44.6% 0.7785 -33.9% 0.7609 -35.4%
ρd,q 0.7721 -37.5% 0.7651 -36.2% 0.7561 -38.8% 0.7921 -31.3% 0.7958 -32.4%
ρR,q 0.3361 -39.3% 0.1794 -66.6% 0.3973 -38.0% 0.2266 -43.5% 0.3324 -33.7%
ρnx/y,q -0.2455 6.1% -0.0879 36.1% -0.2277 -13.5% -0.1097 68.3% -0.2258 37.4%
ρca/y,q -0.3161 -32.8% -0.1574 -57.6% -0.3618 -36.0% -0.2075 -35.4% -0.321 -28.0%
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis.
36